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Abstract
We design algorithms for computing approximately revenue-maximizing sequential posted-
pricing mechanisms (SPM) in K-unit auctions, in a standard Bayesian model. A seller has K
copies of an item to sell, and there are n buyers, each interested in only one copy, who have
some value for the item. The seller must post a price for each buyer, the buyers arrive in a
sequence enforced by the seller, and a buyer buys the item if its value exceeds the price posted
to it. The seller does not know the values of the buyers, but have Bayesian information about
them. An SPM specifies the ordering of buyers and the posted prices, and may be adaptive or
non-adaptive in its behavior.
The goal is to design SPM in polynomial time to maximize expected revenue. We compare
against the expected revenue of optimal SPM, and provide a polynomial time approximation
scheme (PTAS) for both non-adaptive and adaptive SPMs. This is achieved by two algorithms:
an efficient algorithm that gives a (1− 1√
2piK
)-approximation (and hence a PTAS for sufficiently
large K), and another that is a PTAS for constant K. The first algorithm yields a non-adaptive
SPM that yields its approximation guarantees against an optimal adaptive SPM – this implies
that the adaptivity gap in SPMs vanishes as K becomes larger.
1 Introduction
We consider the following Sequential Posted Pricing problem in a K-unit auction. There is a
single seller with K identical copies of a single item to sell, to n prospective buyers. Each buyer
is interested in exactly one copy of the item, and has a value for it that is unknown to the seller.
The buyers arrive in a sequence, and each buyer appears exactly once. The arrival order may be
chosen by the seller. The seller quotes a price for the item to each arriving buyer, and may quote
different prices to different buyers. Assuming that buyers are rational, a buyer buys the item if the
∗Part of this work was done while visiting Google Research. Department of Computer and Information Science.
University of Pennsylvania,Philadelphia, PA. Email tanmoy@cis.upenn.edu
†Google Research, 76 Ninth Ave, New York, NY. Email: evendar@google.com
‡Part of this work was done while visiting Google Research. Department of Computer and Information Science.
University of Pennsylvania,Philadelphia, PA. Email sudipto@cis.upenn.edu
§Google Israel and The Blavatnik School of Computer Science, Tel-Aviv University, Tel-Aviv, Israel, Email
mansour.yishay@gmail.com
¶Google Research, 76 Ninth Ave, New York, NY. Email: muthu@google.com
1
price quoted to him is less than his value for the item, and pays the quoted price to the seller. This
process stops when either K buyers have bought the item or when all buyers have arrived and left.
We focus on pricing and ordering strategies in the above model, called sequential posted-price
mechanisms (SPMs), that maximize the seller’s expected revenue. Posted price mechanisms are
clearly incentive compatible, and commonly used in practice. We design strategies in a Bayesian
framework, where each buyer draws his value of the item from a distribution. These value distri-
butions are known to the seller, and are used in designing the mechanism.
SPMs were recently studied in the general context of Bayesian single-parameter mechanism
design (BSMD), which includes our K-unit auction, by Chawla et. al. [7]. They designed efficiently
computable SPMs for various classes of BSMD problems and compared their expected revenue to
that of the optimal auction mechanism, which was given by Myerson [13]. For the K-unit auction,
they showed that their SPM guarantees (1 − 1/e)-fraction of the revenue obtained by Myerson’s
auction. Bhattacharya et. al. [4] (as well as [7]) also used sequential item pricing to approximate
optimal revenue, when the seller has multiple distinct items. However, the SPM computed by their
algorithms may not be the optimal SPM, i.e. there may exist SPMs with greater expected revenue.
Given that SPMs are quite common in practice, we focus in this paper on efficiently computing an
optimal SPM.
Our Results The results in [7] immediately imply a (1 − 1/e)-approximation for the problem
of computing optimal SPMs in K-unit auction. We strictly improve this bound. We design two
different algorithms – the first is a polynomial time algorithm that gives (1− 1√
2πK
)-approximation,
and is meant for large values of K, and the second is a polynomial time approximation scheme
(PTAS) for constant K. Combining these two algorithms yield a polynomial time approximation
scheme for the optimal SPM problem, for all values of K: if K > 1
2πǫ2
, run the first algorithm,
else run the second algorithm. Recall that a PTAS is an algorithm that, for any given constant
ǫ > 0, yields (1− ǫ)-approximation in polynomial time (the exponent of the polynomial should be
a function of ǫ only, and independent of input size).
Note that a sequential posted pricing strategy can be adaptive – it can alter its prices and the
ordering of the remaining buyers based on whether the current buyer buys the item. We shall call
such strategies as Adaptive SPMs, or ASPMs, while SPM shall refer to a non-adaptive pricing
and ordering strategy. Clearly, the expected revenue from an optimal ASPM is at least that from
an optimal SPM. Our first algorithm outputs an SPM, but our proof shows that it gives the same
approximation guarantee of (1− 1√
2πK
) against an optimal ASPM. This yields a corollary that the
adaptivity gap asymptotically vanishes as K increases. On the other hand, it is easy to construct
instances with K = 2, such that there is a constant factor adaptivity gap, i.e. gap in expected
revenue between optimal SPM and ASPM. We design a third algorithm that outputs an ASPM,
and is a PTAS for computing an optimal ASPM, for constant K. Again, combining this result with
our first algorithm, we obtain a PTAS for the optimal ASPM problem, for all values of K. Adaptive
PTAS with multiplicative approximation is rare to find in stochastic optimization problems. For
example, an adaptive PTAS for the stochastic knapsack problem has been developed very recently
[3]. The theorem below summarizes our results.
Theorem 1 There is a PTAS for computing a revenue-maximizing SPM in K-unit auctions, for
all K. The same result holds for ASPMs.
2
Our Techniques The first algorithm is based on a linear programming (LP) relaxation of the
problem, such that the optimal solution to the LP upper bounds the expected revenue from any
ASPM. We show that this LP has an optimal integral solution, from which we construct a pricing
for the buyers. The buyers are ordered simply in decreasing order of prices – it is easy to see
that this is an optimal ordering policy given the prices. The LP formulation implies that if there
were no limit on the number of copies the seller can sell, then the expected revenue obtained from
this pricing would be equal to the LP optimum, and at most K copies of the item are sold in
expectation. However, the algorithm is restricted to selling at most K copies in all realizations, and
the result follows by bounding the loss due to this hard constraint. The interesting property we
find is that this loss vanishes as K increases. It should be noted that an LP-based approach is
used in [4]; however, they consider a more general problem with multiple distinct items, and their
analysis yielded no better than constant approximation factors.
The second algorithm uses a dynamic programming approach, which is common in the design
of approximation schemes. We make some key observations that reduce the problem to an extended
version of the generalized assignment problem (GAP) [15, 8] with constant number of bins, which
has polynomial time algorithm (polynomial in the size of bins and number of items) using dynamic
programming. The main observation is that in any SPM, if we pick a contiguous subsequence of
buyers to whom there is very small probability of selling even a single copy, and arbitrarily permute
this subsequence, the resulting SPM will have almost the same expected revenue as the original
SPM. This observation drastically cuts down the number of configurations that we have to check
before finding a near-optimal SPM.
The third algorithm for computing ASPM is a generalization of the second algorithm, but it
must now approximate a decision tree, that may branch at every step based on whether a copy
is bought, instead of an SPM sequence. The key observation in this case is that there exists a
near-optimal decision tree that does not branch too often, and the problem again reduces to an
extension of GAP with constant number of bins.
Other Related Work Sequential item pricing for combinatorial auctions has also been studied
in prior-free settings, where no knowledge about the buyers’ valuation is assumed (eg. [1, 6]). These
results compare the revenue obtained to the optimal social welfare, primarily due to lack of a better
upper bound, and get no better than logarithmic approximation results. Maximizing welfare via
truthful mechanisms in prior-free settings have been studied for K-unit auctions [9, 10] and other
combinatorial auctions [11, 12]. Bayesian assumptions provide better upper bounds, and has led to
constant approximation against optimal revenue for any auction [4, 7]. But Bayesian assumptions
can lead to tighter upper bounds on optimal sequential pricing, and that is our main contribution.
A parallel posted-price approach has been used in a more complex repeated ad auction setting to
get constant approximation [5].
2 Preliminaries
In a K-unit auction, there is a single seller who has K identical copies of a single item, and wish to
sell these copies to n prospective buyers B1, B2 . . . Bn. Each buyer Bi is interested in one copy of
the item, and has value vi for it. vi is drawn from a distribution specified by cumulative distribution
function (cdf) Fi that is known to the seller. The values of different buyers are independently drawn
from their respective distributions. Without loss of generality, we assume that K ≤ n.
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Definition 2.1 Let piv denote the probability that Bi has value v for the item. Let p˜iv denote the
probability that Bi has value at least v. We shall call it the success probability when Bi is offered
price v. Clearly p˜iv =
∑
v′≥v piv′ .
We assume, for all our results, that each value distribution is discrete, with at most L distinct
values in its support (i.e. these values have non-zero probability mass). Let UVi be the support
set of values for the distribution of Bi, and let UV =
⋃n
i=1 UVi . We shall also assume that L is
polynomial in n, and that p˜iv is an integral multiple of
1
10n2
for all i, v. These assumptions are
without loss of generality for obtaining PTAS for optimal SPM or ASPM (see Appendix A for a
brief discussion).
Definition 2.2 A sequential posted-price mechanism (SPM) is a mechanism which considers buy-
ers arrive in a sequence, and offers each of them a take-it-or-leave-it price: the buyer may either
buy a copy at the quoted price or leave, upon which the seller makes an offer to another buyer.
Each buyer is given an offer at most once, and the process ends when either all K copies have been
sold, or there is no buyer remaining.
An SPM specifies the entire sequence of buyers and prices before the process begins. In contrast,
an adaptive sequential posted-price mechanism (ASPM) may decide the next buyer based on which
of the current and past buyers accepted their offered prices.
Note that there can be no adaptive behavior when K = 1, since the process stops with the first
accepted price. Thus an ASPM can be specified by a decision tree: each node of the tree contains a
buyer and a price to offer. Each node may have multiple children. The selling process starts at the
root of the tree (i.e. offers the price at the root to the buyer at the root), and based upon whether
a sale occurs at the root, moves to one of the children of the root, and continues inductively. The
process stops when either K items have been sold, or n buyers have appeared on the path in the
decision tree traversed by the process – the latter nodes are the leaves of the decision tree.
It is easy to see that the decision of an optimal ASPM at any node of the tree should depend
only on the number of copies of the item left and the remaining set of buyers (the latter is solely
determined by the node reached by the process). Thus, each node has at most K children, at most
one each for the number of copies left. Note that an ASPM may not adapt immediately to a sale –
it may move to a fixed buyer regardless of the outcome. Such a node will only have a single child.
Without loss of generality, we shall represent an ASPM such that each non-leaf node either has
a single child or K children (some of which may even be infeasible). The latter nodes are called
branching nodes. In this context, an SPM is simply an ASPM whose decision tree is a path.
SPM and ASPM are incentive compatible: a buyer Bi buys the item if and only if its value vi
is equal to or greater than the price offered to it, and pays only the quoted price to the seller.
Definition 2.3 The revenue R(v1, v2 . . . vn) obtained by the seller for a given SPM is the sum of the
payments made by all the buyers, which is a function of the valuations of the buyers. The expected
revenue of an SPM or ASPM is computed over the value distributions Evi∼FiR(v1, v2 . . . vn). An
optimal SPM or ASPM is an SPM (respectively, ASPM) that gives the highest expected revenue
among all SPMs (respectively, ASPMs).
Let the expected revenue of an optimal SPM (or ASPM) be OPT. An α-approximate SPM (or
ASPM, respectively), where α ≤ 1, has expected revenue at least αOPT.
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2.1 Basic Result
An SPM must specify an ordering of the buyers as well as the prices to offer to them. It is worth
noting that if either one of these tasks is fixed, the other task becomes easy.
Lemma 2.1 Given take-it-or-leave-it prices to offer to the buyers, a revenue-maximizing SPM with
these prices simply considers buyers in the order of decreasing prices. Given an ordering of buyers,
one can compute in polynomial time a revenue-maximizing ASPM that uses this ordering (and only
adapts the offered prices).
Proof: For the first claim, consider an SPM where there are two buyers Bi and Bj, such that Bi
arrives just before Bj, but is offered a lower price than Bj. Consider the modified SPM created
by swapping Bi and Bj in the order, while keeping the price offered to Bi, Bj and other buyers
unchanged. In realizations where at most one of Bi or Bj accepts the price, the revenue of the
original and modified SPMs are equal. However, in realizations where both buyers accept their
offered prices, the selling process may not reach the latter buyer, and so the modified SPM has
higher or equal revenue in that case.
For the second claim, we can compute the prices using dynamic programming. Let the buyers
be ordered as Bπ(1), Bπ(2) . . . Bπ(n). Let A(i, j) denote the maximum expected revenue that can
be obtained from the last i buyers in the given ordering, if there are j items left to sell to them.
For initialization, set A(1, 0) = 0, and A(1, j) = maxx∈UV xPr [vn ≥ x] for j ≥ 1, which is the
maximum expected revenue from Bn with the item in stock. Suppose A(i−1, j) has been computed
for all j. Then A(i, j) can be computed by iterating through all possible prices to offer Bn−i+1,
and pick one that yields highest expected revenue. For a price x ∈ UV , the expected revenue is
(x+ A(i − 1, j − 1))Pr [vn−i+1 ≥ x] +A(i − 1, j)Pr [vn−i+1 < x]. Finally, A(n,K) is the expected
revenue. Note that we could store, along with A(i, j), the optimal price p, and these prices yield
the required ASPM.
3 LP-based Algorithm for Large K
In this section we present our first algorithm that yields us an approximation factor that improves
as K increases, and implies a vanishing adaptivity gap. The following theorem summarizes our
result.
Theorem 2 For all K ≥ 1, if a seller has K units to sell, there exists an SPM whose expected
revenue is at least 1− K
K
K!eK
≥ 1− 1√
2πK
fraction of the optimal ASPM. This SPM can be computed
in polynomial time.
As a first step to our algorithm, we add random infinitesimal perturbation to the values v ∈ UVi
and the associated probability values piv, so that almost surely, UVi are disjoint, and further, all the
values and probabilities are in general position. Intuitively, this property is used in our algorithm
to break ties.
Consider any ASPM P, that may even be randomized. Consider the event Eiv that Bi is offered
the item at price v, and accepts the offer. Let yiv denote the probability of that Eiv occurs when P
is implemented. Let xiv denote the probability that Bi was offered price v when P is implemented.
Note that both probabilities are taken over the value distributions of the buyers, as well as internal
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randomization of P. Naturally, we must have yiv ≤ p˜ivxiv. Also, by linearity of expectation, the
expected revenue obtained by P is
∑n
i=1
∑
v∈UV vyiv. Moreover,
∑n
i=1
∑
v∈UV yiv is the expected
number of copies of the item sold by the seller, and this quantity must be at most K. Finally, the
mechanism enforces that each buyer is offered a price at most once in any realization, and hence
in expectation,i.e.
∑
v∈UV xiv ≤ 1.
Viewing xiv and yiv as variables depending upon the selected ASPM, optimum of the following
linear program Lp-K-SPM provides an upper bound to the expected revenue from any ASPM,
since any ASPM provides feasible assignment to the variables. Our algorithm involves computing
an optimal solution to this program with a specific structure, and use the solution to construct an
SPM. We also consider its dual program, Dual-K-SPM.
Lp-K-SPM = max
n∑
i=1
∑
v∈UV
vyiv
yiv ≤ p˜ivxiv ∀i ∈ [1, n], v ∈ UV∑
v∈UV xiv ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ [1, n]∑n
i=1
∑
v∈UV yiv ≤ K
yiv, xiv ≥ 0
Dual-K-SPM = minKτ +
∑
i
λi
ζiv + τ ≥ v
λi −
∑
v
p˜ivζiv ≥ 0
ζiv, λi, τ ≥ 0
Lemma 3.1 Assuming that the points in UVi and the probabilities p˜iv have been perturbed in-
finitesimally, and so are in general position, there exists an optimal structured solution x∗iv, y
∗
iv of
Lp-K-SPM, computable in polynomial time, such that:
1. for all i, v, yiv = p˜ivxiv.
2. for each i there is exactly one v such that xiv > 0. Let v(i) denote the value for which
xiv(i) > 0.
3. There exists at most one i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n and xiv(i) = 1. If such i = i
′ exists, then
v(i′) = minni=1 v(i).
Proof: Given any feasible solution to Lp-K-SPM, where yiv < p˜ivxiv for some i, v, we can simply
reduce xiv till yiv becomes equal to p˜ivxiv. This change keeps the solution feasible, and also leaves
the objective unchanged. So we can simply eliminate the variables yiv from Lp-K-SPM by setting
yiv = p˜ivxiv. An optimal solution to this modified LP will also be an optimal solution for the
original LP, and naturally satisfy the first condition in the lemma. By a minor abuse of notation,
we refer to this modified LP as Lp-K-SPM.
Let us now consider the Lagrangian program LagrangianSPM(τ) obtained by removing the
constraint of selling at most K copies, and associating a cost τ of violating this constraint in the
objective. The following property holds by LP duality: let τ∗ be the assignment to variable τ in
an optimal solution to Dual-K-SPM. Then the optimum of LagrangianSPM(τ∗) is equal to the
optimum of Lp-K-SPM in value. We shall compute an optimal solution of LagrangianSPM(τ∗)
that is also feasible for Lp-K-SPM, and satisfies either τ∗ = 0 or
∑
i
∑
v p˜ivxiv = K. Such a
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solution must also be an optimal solution of Lp-K-SPM.
LagrangianSPM(τ) = max
(∑
i
∑
v
vp˜ivxiv + τ(K −
∑
i
∑
v
p˜ivxiv)
)
= Kτ +
∑
i
max
∑
v
(v − τ)p˜ivxiv
∑
v
xiv ≤ 1
yiv, xiv ≥ 0
If p˜iv = 0, then we assume that xiv is set to zero, since this does not affect feasibility or value
of the objective. Let an optimal solution of LagrangianSPM(τ∗) be denoted by x∗iv(τ
∗). Such a
solution must satisfy x∗iv(τ
∗) = 0 for all v < τ∗. Further for some i, if maxv(v− τ∗)p˜iv is maximized
at a unique v, then x∗iv(τ
∗) = 1 if v = argmaxv∈UVi {(v − τ
∗)p˜iv|v ≥ τ∗}, and 0 otherwise. If
maxv(v − τ
∗)p˜iv > 0, then the added perturbations ensure that the maximum is indeed unique.
Suppose the maximum is zero for some i, then p˜iv = 0 and so x
∗
iv(τ
∗) = 0 ∀v > τ∗. Since every
buyer has some non-zero probability of having a positive value for the item (else we can simply
neglect such buyers), we have τ∗ > 0. The only x∗iv(τ
∗) that we may set to a non-zero value is
for v = τ∗, provided that τ∗ ∈ UVi . Because of added perturbations, this can happen for at most
one buyer i. We first fix the assignment of all other variables as described above, then set this x∗iv
to the highest value less than 1 such that
∑
i
∑
v p˜ivxiv) ≤ K. This gives our required structured
solution. Given τ∗, constructing the solution requires linear time. As mentioned before, τ∗ can be
computed by solving Dual-K-SPM; one may also use binary search techniques for this purpose,
similar to many packing LPs (details omitted, see, eg. [14]).
Our algorithm for computing an SPM is as follows:
1. Compute an optimal structured solution of Lp-K-SPM.
2. In the SPM, offer price v(i) to Bi, and consider buyers in order of decreasing v(i).
3.1 Approximation Factor
It remains to analyze the approximation factor of our algorithm. Let the order of decreasing
prices be Bπ(1), Bπ(2) . . . Bπ(n). For 1 ≤ i < n, let Zi be a two-valued random variable that is
v(π(i)) = zi with probability p˜π(i)v(π(i)) = ui, and 0 otherwise. To define Zn, note that x
∗
π(n)v(π(n))
in the structured optimal solution may not have been 1, so let Zn be v(π(n)) = zn with probability
x∗
π(n)v(π(n))p˜π(n)v(π(n)) = un and 0 otherwise. If Z =
∑n
i=1 Zi, then E[Z] is the optimum of the
LP solution. The revenue of the algorithm, however, is at least equal to the sum of the first K
variables in the sequence Z1, Z2 . . . Zn that are non-zero. Let this sum be denoted by the random
variable Z ′. Note that z1 ≥ z2 ≥ . . . ≥ zn, and
∑n
i=1 ui ≤ K. The following lemma immediately
implies Theorem 2.
Lemma 3.2 E[Z ′] ≥ (1− K
K
K!eK
)E[Z] ≥ (1− 1√
2πK
)E[Z].
Proof: Let α(i) = ziui. Let the probability that we reach Zi in the sequence before finding K non-
zero variables, be given by the function f(i, ~u) (this function is independent of z1, z2 . . . zn), where
~u = (u1, u2 . . . un). Then E[Z
′] =
∑n
i=1 f(i, ~u)α(i), while E[Z] =
∑n
=1 α(i). Observe that f(i, ~u)
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is monotonically decreasing in i. We shall narrow down the the instances on which E[Z ′]/E[Z] is
minimized.
Claim 3.1 Given an instance comprising variables Z1, Z2 . . . Zn such that zi > zi+1, one can
modify it to construct another instance Z˜1, Z˜2 . . . Z˜n such that E[Z
′]/E[Z] decreases.
Proof: We modify the instance by defining α′(j) for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and setting the possible non-zero
value of Z˜j to be z˜j = α
′(j)/uj , with success probability remaining uj:
α′(j) =


α(j) if j 6= i, i+ 1
α(i)−∆ if j = i
α(i + 1) + ∆ if j = i+ 1
where ∆ =
zi − zi+1
1
u(i) +
1
u(i+1)
> 0
Note that Z˜j = Zj ∀j 6= i, i+1, so only Zi and Zi+1 gets modified. Further, z˜j are non-increasing
in j (in fact, z˜i = ˜zi+1) so the modified instance is valid. Also,
∑
i α(i) =
∑
i α
′(i), so E[Z] remains
unchanged. ~u remains unchanged too, and hence the probabilities f(i, ~u). Finally, the change in
E[Z ′] is (f(i+ 1, ~u)− f(i, ~u))∆ < 0, i.e. E[Z ′] decreases.
Thus, we can restrict our attention to instances where z1 = z2 = . . . = zn = z
∗ (say). Without
loss of generality, we let z = 1, so that Z1, Z2 . . . are Bernoulli variables, and Z
′ = min{Z,K}.
Note that the ordering of the variables do not influence Z ′. The next step is to show that if we
split the variables, keeping E[Z] unchanged, E[Z ′] can only decrease.
Claim 3.2 Let Z1, Z2 . . . Zn be Bernoulli variables, such that the success probability is Pr [Zj = 1] =
uj . Suppose that we modify the set of variables by removing Zi from it and adding two Bernoulli
variables Z˜i and Zˆi to it, where Pr
[
Z˜i = 1
]
= u˜i > 0 and Pr
[
Zˆi = 1
]
= uˆi > 0, and u˜i + uˆi = ui.
Then E[Z ′] = E[minZ,K ] decreases or remains unchanged due to this modification, while E[Z] = K
remains unchanged.
Proof: Let X be the sum of the remaining variables, i.e. X =
∑i−1
j=1 Zj +
∑n
j=i+1 Zj. We shall
show that E[Z ′|X ≤ K − 2] and E[Z ′|X ≥ K] remain unchanged by the modification, while
E[Z ′|X = K − 1] decreases, thus proving .
If X ≤ K − 2, then Z ′ is X + Zi in the original instance, and X + Z˜i + Zˆi in the modified
instance. Since E[Zi] = E[Z˜i + Zˆi] = ui, so E[Z
′|X ≤ K − 2] remains unchanged. Also, if X ≥ K,
then Z ′ is simply K in both instances. If X = K − 1, then Z ′ = K− 1+Zi in the original instance
and Z ′ = K − 1+min{1, Z˜i + Zˆi} in the modified instance. So E[Z ′|X = K − 1] = K − 1+ ui and
E[Z ′|K − 1] = K − 1 +Pr
[
Z˜i + Zˆi ≥ 1
]
= K − 1 + (u˜i + uˆi − u˜iuˆi) < K − 1 + ui, respectively.
Assume that the success probabilities of the Bernoulli variables are all rational – since rational
numbers form a dense set in reals, this shall not change the lower bound we are seeking. Then, there
exists some large integer N such that all the probabilities are integral multiples of 1/N . Further,
we can choose an arbitrarily large N for this purpose. Now, split each variable that has success
probability t/N into t variables, each with success probability 1/N . The above claim implies that
E[Z ′]/E[Z] can only decrease due to the splitting. Thus, it remains to lower bound E[Z ′]/K for
the following instance, as N →∞: KN Bernoulli variables, each with success probability 1/N .
For this final step, we use the well-known property that the sum of Bernoulli variables with
infinitesimal success probabilities approach the Poisson distribution with the same mean. In par-
ticular, if P is a Poisson variable with mean K, then the total variation distance between Z and
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P is at most (1 − e−K)/N (see e.g. [2]), which tends to zero as N → ∞. Thus, we simply need
to find E[minP,K]/K, and this is the lower bound on E[Z ′]/E[Z] that we are seeking. It can be
verified that E[minP,K] = K(1− K
K
K!eK
) (see Appendix B), which proves the lemma.
4 PTAS for constant K
We now define an optimization problem called VersionGAP, and our PTAS for both SPM and
ASPM for constant K will reduce to solving multiple instances of this problem.
VersionGAP: Suppose there are n objects, and each object has L versions. Let version j of
object i have profit pij and size sij ≤ 1. Also, suppose there are C bins 1, 2 . . . C, where bin ℓ has
size sℓ and a discount factor γℓ . The goal is to place versions of objects to bins, such that:
1. Each object can be placed into a particular bin at most once, as a unique version. If object i
is placed as version j into bin ℓ, then it realizes a profit of γℓpij and a size of sij.
2. Each object can appear in multiple bins, as different versions. However, there is a given
collection FC of feasible subsets of bins 1, 2 . . . C. The set of bins that an object is placed into
must be a feasible subset.
3. The sum of realized sizes of objects placed into any bin ℓ must be less than sℓ.
The profit made by an assignment of object version to bins, that satisfy all the above conditions,
is the sum of realized profits by all objects placed in the bins. The goal is to find an assignment
that maximizes the profit.
Lemma 4.1 For all objects and versions i, j, let sij be a multiple of 1/M for some fixed M ≥ 2.
Then an optimal solution to VersionGAP can be found in time (ML)O(C)n.
Proof: The algorithm is a simple dynamic programming. Order the objects arbitrarily. Let
D(i, j1, j2 . . . jC) be an optimal feasible assignment (or the profit thereof, by an abuse of notation)
of the first i objects, such that the sum of realized sizes of objects in bin ℓ is jℓ, for ℓ = 1, 2 . . . C.
D(i, j1, j2 . . . jC) is assigned as null and its profit as −∞ if no such assignment exists. Note that
we only consider jℓ to be multiples of 1/M and at most 1, for all ℓ.
D(0, j1, j2 . . . jC) is null for all j1, j2 . . . jC , except for D(0, 0, 0 . . . 0) which is zero. Suppose
D(i − 1, j1, j2 . . . jC) have been computed for all j1, j2 . . . jC . Then to compute D(i, j1 . . . jC), we
first choose a feasible subset of bins from FC to place it in (|FC | < 2
C choices), then its version
in each bin in this subset (at most LC choices), and then compute the objective as D(i − 1, j1 −
sit1 , j2 − sit2 . . . jC − sitC ) +
∑C
ℓ=1 γℓpitℓ , where tℓ is the version in which object i is chosen to be
placed in bin ℓ (if the object is not placed in bin ℓ, treat sitℓ and pitℓ as zero).
We iterate through all the choices to maximizes this objective. Thus, computing each entry
D(i, j1 . . . jC) takes time at most O(C(2L)
C). The number of entries is at most nMC . The maxi-
mum among all the entries gives the required assignment.
4.1 PTAS for Computing SPM
We now design an algorithm to compute a near-optimal SPM for constant K.
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Theorem 3 There exists a PTAS for computing an optimal SPM, for any constant K. The run-
ning time of the algorithm is
(
nk
ǫ
)poly(k,ǫ−1)
, and gives (1− ǫ)-approximation.
We shall, without loss of generality, give a (1 − ckǫ)-approximation, and this will imply the
above theorem: putting ǫ = ǫ′/ck will yield a (1− ǫ′)-approximation.
We first establish some definitions that we shall use. Let a segment refer to a sequence of some
buyers and prices offered to these buyers – we shall refer to parts of an SPM as segments. Let the
undiscounted contribution V(Bi) of a buyer Bi, when offered price x(Bi), be α(Bi) = x(Bi)p˜ix(Bi),
while its weight be p˜ix(Bi), its success probability. Undiscounted contribution V(S) of a segment S
is the sum of undiscounted contributions of buyers in the segment, and the weight of the segment
is the sum of their weights.
Given an SPM, let dis(B) denote the probability that the selling process reaches buyer B. The
real contribution of a buyer to the expected revenue is α(B)dis(B), and the expected revenue of
the SPM is the sum of the real contributions of all the buyers. More generally, let γℓ(B) denote the
probability that Bi is reached with at least ℓ items remaining. Then dis(B) = γ1(B). The discount
factor dis(S) of a segment S, whose first buyer is B, is defined to be dis(B). Similarly, we define
γℓ(S) = γℓ(B).
We present our algorithm through a series of structural lemmas, each of which follows quite
easily from the preceding lemmas. The first step towards our algorithm is that we can restrict our
attention to truncated SPMs.
Lemma 4.2 There exists an SPM of total weight at most K log K
ǫ
, where each buyer has discount
factor at least ǫ, that gives an expected revenue of at least (1− ǫ)OPT. We shall refer to SPMs that
satisfy this condition as truncated.
Proof: Consider the smallest prefix of the optimal SPM (with expected revenue OPT) such that the
discount factor of the corresponding suffix, obtained by removing the prefix, is at most ǫ. Moreover,
if we were to simply omit this prefix, then the expected revenue of the remaining segment can at
most be OPT. So the contribution of the remaining segment to the optimal SPM is at most ǫOPT,
and the prefix alone has expected revenue expected revenue at least (1− ǫ)OPT. By Fact 4.1, the
probability that no copy gets sold in a segment of weight log K
ǫ
is at most ǫ/K. Thus the weight
of the prefix is at most K log K
ǫ
.
We can now restrict ourself to approximating an optimal truncated SPM. The following defini-
tion of a permutable segment will be crucial to the description of our algorithm.
Definition 4.1 We shall call an SPM segment permutable if either:
1. its weight is at most δ = ǫ
3
20K3
. We shall refer to such a permutation segment as a small
buyers segment.
2. it has a single buyer, possibly of weight more than δ. In this case, we shall refer to this buyer
as a big buyer.
Any SPM can clearly be decomposed into a sequence of permutable segments and big buyers.
Moreover, any truncated SPM can be decomposed into a sequence of at most C = O(
K log K
ǫ
δ
)
permutable segments. This is because if the permutable segments are maximally chosen, then two
consecutive permutable segments in the decomposition either have at least one big buyer between
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them, or their weights must add up to more than δ (otherwise, the two segments can be joined to
create one permutable segment).
Fact 4.1 Let 1 > y1, y2 . . . yℓ > 0. Let
∑ℓ
j=1 yj = s. Then 1−s+s
2 > e−s >
∏ℓ
j=1(1−yj) > 1−s.
Lemma 4.3 The probability of selling at least one copy of the item in a small buyers permutable
segment that has weight s is at least s−s2. The probability of selling at least t ≥ 1 copies (assuming
that at least t copies are left as inventory) in such a segment is at most st. So the probability of
selling exactly one copy is at least s− 2s2.
Proof: Fact 4.1 implies that the probability of selling at least one item is at least s − s2 and at
most s.
For the second statement, consider t = 2. Conditioning on a particular buyer B in the segment
buying a copy, the probability that the remaining buyers in the segment buy at least one copy is at
most s. The two events are independent, so the probability of their simultaneous occurrence is the
product of their probabilities. Summing over all buyers in the segment, we get that the probability
that at least two items are bought is at most s2. The argument scales in a similar fashion for higher
values of t: probability that t items are bought is at most st.
Lemma 4.4 Consider a permutable segment of weight s appearing in an SPM, and let its discount
factor be γ. Then the discount factor of the last buyer in the segment is at least γ(1 − s). If the
undiscounted contribution of the segment is α, then the real contribution of buyers in this segment
to the expected revenue is at least αγ(1 − δ) and at most αγ.
Proof: The probability of the process not stopping inside the segment, conditioned upon reaching
it, is at least the probability of not selling any copy in the segment, which is at least 1 − s (it is
exactly 1− s for a big buyer segment).
The above lemma shows that the real contribution of a segment can be approximated by the
product of its discount factor and its undiscounted contribution, which does not depend on the exact
buyers, their relative ordering or prices in that segment. We next show that the discount factor of
a segment, given a decomposition of an SPM into permutable segments, can also be approximated
as a function of the approximate sizes of preceding segments.
Lemma 4.5 Given an SPM, that can be decomposed into an ordering of permutable segments
S1, S2 . . .. Let Si be a small buyers segment. Let s be the weight of Si.
Then γℓ(Si)(1 − s) + γℓ+1(Si)s+ 4s
2 ≥ γℓ(Si+1) ≥ γℓ(Si)(1 − s) + γℓ+1(Si)s− 2s
2.
Proof: Directly using the bounds in Lemma 4.3 to the formula:
γℓ(Si+1) =
∑K
j=ℓ γj(Si)Pr [Exactly (j − ℓ)copies of the item are bought by buyers in Si].
The lemma below follows easily from Lemma 4.5.
Lemma 4.6 Given any SPM decomposed into Q ≤ C permutable segments S1, S2 . . ., such that
the weight of Si is between si + τ and si − τ for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n
′, where τ = δ/20C. Consider an
alternate SPM (with possibly different buyers), that has n′ buyers, and the ith buyer in the segment
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has weight si. Let ρ(ℓ, i) be the probability that the i
th buyer is reached in the alternate SPM with
at least ℓ items remaining. Then
ρ(ℓ, i) − 12(δ2 + τ)i) ≤ γℓ(Si) ≤ ρ(ℓ, i) + 12(δ
2 + τ)i) .
If the SPM is truncated, then dis(Si) = γ1(Si) ≥ ǫ, and since i ≤ Q ≤ C, δ =
ǫ3
20K3
and
τ ≤ δ/20C, so we can get a multiplicative guarantee ρ(1, i)(1 − ǫ) ≤ dis(Si) ≤ ρ(1, i)(1 + ǫ) .
We shall refer to the following as a configuration: An ordering of up to C permutable segments,
where each permutable segment is specified only by the weight of the segment and big buyer
respectively, each weight being a multiple of τ = δ20C . Note that the configuration does NOT specify
which buyer belongs to which segment, or the individual weights of the buyers. This is because a
configuration is specified by at most C positive integers (weight of each segment is specified by a
positive integer z < 1
τ
, which indicates that the weight is zτ). We shall represent a configuration
z as an ordered tuple of integers (z1, z2, z3 . . .). Note that there are at most (
1
τ
)O(C) = (K
ǫ
)O(K)
distinct configurations. We say that an SPM has configuration z if it can be decomposed into an
ordering of permutable segments S1, S2 . . . such that Si has weight at least (zi − 1)τ and at most
ziτ .
For any given configuration z, the expected revenue of an SPM with configuration z can be
approximated, up to a factor of (1− δ)(1− 2ǫ) by a linear combination of the undiscounted contri-
bution of the permutable segments, where the coefficients of the linear combination depend only on
z. The coefficients are the discount factors, which can be computed by looking at an alternate SPM
with a buyer for each segment, such that the ith buyer has weight ziτ . This is a direct conclusion
of Lemma 4.6 and Lemma 4.4. The discount factors of each buyer in the alternate SPM can be
easily computed in O(CK) time using dynamic programming. Let Az(i) denote the discount factor
of the ith buyer in the alternate SPM corresponding to z.
For any configuration z, we compute prices for the buyers, and a division of buyers into per-
mutable segments S1, S2 . . . such that Si has weight at most ziτ , and
∑
iAz(i)V(Si) is maximized
(it is not necessary to include all buyers). This is precisely an instance of VersionGAP, where
each buyer is an object, the different possible prices and the corresponding success probabilities
create the different versions, and the sizes of the bins are given by z, and the feasible subsets
for an object simply being that each object can get into at most one bin. This can be solved as
per Lemma 4.1. The solution may not saturate every bin, and hence may not actually belong to
configuration z. However, for any two configurations z = (z1, z2, zt) and z
′ = (z′1, z
′
2 . . . z
′
t), such
that zi ≤ z
′
i ∀1 ≤ i ≤ t, we have Az(i) > Az′(i). So the SPM formed by concatenating S1, S2 . . . in
that order generates revenue at least (1 − 3ǫ) times the revenue of the optimal sequence that has
configuration z.
Thus our algorithm is to find an SPM for each configuration, using the algorithm for VersionGAP,
and output the best SPM among them as the solution.
4.2 PTAS for Computing ASPM
We now design an algorithm to compute a near-optimal SPM for constant K.
Theorem 4 There exists a PTAS for computing an optimal SPM, for any constant K. The run-
ning time of the algorithm is
(
nk
ǫ
)(kǫ−1)O(k)
, and gives (1− ǫ)-approximation.
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As mention in Section 2, an ASPM is specified by a decision tree, with each node containing a
buyer and an offer price. We extend some definitions used for SPMs to ASPMs. The weight of a
node is the success probability at this node conditioned on being reached. A segment in an ASPM
is a contiguous part of a path (that the selling process might take) in the decision tree. A segment
is called non-branching if all but possibly the last node are non-branching. Other definitions such
as weight and contribution of a segment are identical. A permutation segment is a non-branching
segment satisfying properties as defined earlier (Definition 4.1). The discount factor of a node (or
a segment starting at this node, or a subtree rooted at this node) is the probability that the node
is reached in the selling process.
Consider any ASPM whose tree is decomposable into D non-branching segments, each of weight
at most H. (Note that D = 1 for an SPM.) Then the entire tree of a truncated ASPM decomposes
into C = O(DH/δ) permutable segments. We shall refer to such ASPMs as C-truncated ASPMs.
A configuration for a C-truncated ASPM shall now list the weights of at most C permutable
segments and also specify a tree structure among them, i.e. the parent segment of each segment in
the decision tree. Moreover, since each path can have no more than C segments, it is sufficient to
specify the weights to the nearest multiple of τ = δ/20C, to get the discount factor of each segment
with sufficient accuracy. So there are (C/τ)O(C) = CO(C) configurations for C-truncated ASPMs.
For each configuration, we can use VersionGAP to compute an ASPM that is at least (1−ǫ) times
the revenue of an optimal ASPM with that configuration, as before. Each VersionGAP instance
has C bins in this case. The discount factor of each permutable segment in the configuration can be
computed with sufficient accuracy, similar to Lemma 4.6. Iterating over all possible configurations,
we can find a near-optimal C-truncated ASPM. Solving VersionGAP requires time exponential in
the number of bins (see Lemma 4.1), so the entire running time of the above algorithm is
(
nkC
ǫ
)O(C)
).
The problem is that for the above algorithm to be a PTAS, C must be a function of K and
ǫ−1 only. Lemma 4.7 achieves this goal through a non-trivial structural characterization, and
immediately implies Theorem 4.
Lemma 4.7 There exists an ASPM with the following properties:
1. Its expected revenue is at least (1− ǫ) times the expected revenue of the optimal ASPM.
2. The decision tree is decomposable into D = (K/ǫ)O(K) non-branching segments.
3. Each non-branching segment in the tree has weight at most H = (K/ǫ)O(1).
4. Each path in the tree consists of at most (K/ǫ)O(1) permutable segments.
Proof: Let us view an optimal ASPM decision tree, with expected revenue OPT as consisting of
a spine, which is the path followed if no buyer buys a copy, along with decision subtrees hanging
from many, possibly all, nodes of the spine. Note that all nodes may not be branching nodes, so a
spine need not be left by the process at the very moment that a sale is recorded, but may branch
out at a later point. Each such subtree, hanging from a node w (say) on the spine, are optimal
ASPMs for selling some ℓ < K copies to only buyers that are do not appear in any ancestor node
of w. We shall only focus on how to modify the ASPM to have
• there are at most (K/ǫ)O(1) branching nodes on the spine, and
• the weight of the spine shall be at most (K/ǫ)O(1),
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while only losing a factor of (1− cǫ) in expected revenue for some constant c.
The subtrees, since they are selling less than K copies, can be transformed inductively (when
a single copy is left, the subtree is just a path and trivially satisfies the required properties). Such
a tree will satisfy the properties listed in Lemma 4.7 (for the last property, note that any path
can be decomposed into at most K contiguous parts, each of which is a spines of some subtree,
since leaving a spine implies a sale). Overall, the entire transformation shall cause a loss factor of
(1− cKǫ). This achieves our goal, since we could have instead started by scaling down ǫ to ǫ/cK.
As a first step, we truncate the spine. For any node w, let R(w) be the expected revenue
obtained from the rest of the selling process (excluding the contribution of the buyer at w itself),
conditioned upon the selling process reaching node w. We find the earliest (i.e. closest to the root)
node w on the spine such that R(w) ≤ ǫOPT, and delete all children of w and the subtrees under
them. This only causes a loss of ǫOPT – moreover, the probability of reaching w could have been at
most ǫ, so the weight of the truncated spine is at most K log K
ǫ
(similar argument as Lemma 4.2).
This immediately achieves the second property listed above, and it remains to limit the number of
branching nodes. We can now assume that R(w) > ǫOPT for all nodes w on the spine.
For a node w, let R′(w) denote, conditioned upon the selling process reaching w and then have
less than K items to sell after w, the expected revenue from the rest of the selling process. Clearly,
R′(w) < R(w), since only higher revenue can be gained from the same set of buyers if there are
more copies of the item to sell. A somewhat less obvious fact is that R′(w) > R(w)/4K. This is
because R′(w) is the result of selling at least one copy of the item to the same set of buyers as
R(w), except that R(w) may have as many as K copies of the item. Looking back at Section 3, if
the number of items is decreased from K to 1 (keeping set of buyers unchanged), then the optimum
of the linear program Lp-K-SPM decreases by a factor of at most K (scaling down the variables
by a factor of K gives a feasible solution), and the optimal revenue is always within factor 1/2 of
the LP optimum (since 1 − 1√
2πK
≥ 1/2 for all K). This shows that R′(w) > ǫOPT/4K for all
nodes on the spine.
Divide the spine into segments that either consist of a single buyer, or multiple buyers whose
weights add up to no more than δ. These segments may have branching nodes in them, and hence
may not be permutable. Clearly there are at most (K/ǫ)O(1) such segments, and now we shall
focus on modifying each segment separately. We shall modify subtrees hanging from nodes in
the segment, so that the segment can be subdivided into poly(K/ǫ) non-branching segments, thus
completing the proof. Clearly we need to only consider those segments that comprise multiple small
buyers. Let us consider one such segment, and describe the necessary modification to the tree.
Define a minimal set of pivotal nodes in the segment, that satisfies the following condition: For
any node w in the segment, there is a pivotal node v that is a descendant of w, such that R′(v) ≥
(1 − ǫ)R′(w). Since ǫ4KOPT ≤ R
′(w) ≤ OPT for all nodes w, we have at most O(ǫ−1 log(K/ǫ))
pivotal nodes. We shall make modifications to the decision tree so that the pivotal nodes are the
only branching nodes in the segment.
Let v be the pivotal node satisfying this condition for w, that is nearest to w in the segment.
Suppose that w is a branching node. We delete all children of w that are not part of the spine,
and simply make it a non-branching node. We do this for all non-pivotal, branching nodes in the
segment. Recall that at every branching node, the choice of which children the process follows is
based only upon the number of copies of the item left. Now, the segment has few enough branching
nodes – branching nodes are a subset of pivotal nodes. To argue a limited loss in revenue, we need
to analyze the values R′(w) in the modified trees, let us denote them by R′mod(w). It suffices to
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show that R′mod(w) ≥ (1−2ǫ)R
′(w). Since R′(w1) and R′w2 , where w1 and w2 are distinct nodes on
the spine, are expectations conditioned upon disjoint events, this implies that the expected revenue
of the entire tree falls by a factor of at most (1− 2ǫ) due to this modification.
To show that R′mod(w) ≥ (1 − 2ǫ)R
′(w), we can almost say that R′mod(w) is at least to R
′(v),
since the branching has been deferred until node v. The only difference is that some small buyers
get executed between w and v. So if there are ℓ items left after w, there may be less than ℓ items
when v is reached in the modified tree – however, the probability of this event is less than δ, and is
independent of the history of events up to w. So, neglecting the contribution of nodes between w and
v (but taking into account their discounting effect on descendant nodes), R′mod(w) ≥ (1− δ)R
′(v).
Since R′(v) ≥ (1− ǫ)R′(w), we have our result.
Thus each segment has at most O(ǫ−1 log(K/ǫ)) branching nodes now, which implies that the
entire spine has (K/ǫ)O(1) branching nodes. This completes the proof.
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A Discretization
We explain why we can assume the following for the value distribution of each buyer: it is discrete,
and the probability mass at all points, if non-zero, is an integer multiple of 1
n2
. The assumption
can only cause a loss of (1 − 1
n
) in the expected revenue: given an instance, we can create a
discrete distribution with the above properties, corresponding to each value distribution, and an
algorithm for computing an α-approximate SPM or ASPM in the modified instance gives an α(1−
1
n
)-approximation for the original instance.
Let civ = vp˜iv be the expected revenue from buyer Bi if price v is posted to it. First, we can
simply keep only those v that are powers of (1 − 1
n2
), and assume that there is probability mass
on only these points (leave p˜iv unchanged). Next, for each such v, alter v and p˜iv so that their
product civ remains unchanged, but p˜iv changes to the closest integral multiple of
1
n2
that is greater
than p˜iv. This does not change the possible choices of expected revenue that can be obtained from
a buyer upon reaching it, and their effect on future buyers, i.e. success probability, changes by
1/n2. The changes in the effect on the future can add up over n buyers to change the probability
of reaching a particular buyer by at most 1/n, so we can neglect this change.
B A Property of Poisson Distribution
The proof of Lemma 3.2 uses the following property of Poisson variables.
Lemma B.1 Let P be a Poisson variable with mean K, i.e. for all integers m ≥ 0, Pr [P = m] =
Km
m!eK
. Then E[max{0, P−K}] = K
K+1
K!eK
, and so E[min{P,K}] = E[P−max{0, P−K}] = K−K
K+1
K!eK
.
Proof: All we need to show is that
∑∞
m=K+1
Km(m−K)
m! =
KK+1
K! .
It is easy to show by induction that for any j ≥ 1,
KK+1
K!
−
K+j∑
m=K+1
Km(m−K)
m!
=
KK+j+1
(K + j)!
.
Since limx→∞ K
x+1
x! = 0, the proof is complete.
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